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| Hani Shukrallah, Egyptian journalist, author |
I'd like to share today in my blog a brilliant article
of Hani Shukrallah posted in Egyptian Ahram-Online.
This article is definitely worth reading and describes
Egyptian current political situation, the position of Muslim Brotherhood, its
choices and the way of the safe exist form the political life of Egypt, as the
author of this article predicts that it is very unlikely the Muslim Brotherhood
could stay in power during all four years of Mohamed Morsy'd presidential term.
The Brotherhood, its fateful choices and safe
exits
It is highly unlikely that Muslim Brotherhood
rule will outlast President Morsi's four-year term; the real question is the
manner of their exit from power.
Hani Shukrallah , Thursday 27 Sep 2012.
The ruling (in a manner of speaking) Muslim
Brotherhood faces a strategic, even fateful decision: granting that they’ll be
removed from power within 4 years at the outside, they need to make up their
minds whether they’d rather bow out gracefully or be thrown out, exit via the
ballot box, or revolution.
The two outcomes are very different in their
ramifications. Pluralistic democracy assumes political parties bowing
gracefully out of power; they move from government to opposition benches,
certainly regret their loss of power and influence but enjoy the opposition’s
privilege of criticizing any and all government policies, including blaming the
standing government for economic and social flaws they themselves had
contributed to making or failed to resolve.
Gracefully conceding the shifts in popular
moods, inclinations and more important, in the social and political balance of
forces in the society, also allows political movements to evolve, adapt,
transform themselves. Ultimately, they get to fight another day, and have a
hand at winning political office yet again and again.
This is very different from being thrown out of
power, kicking and screaming all the way. There is almost invariably a certain
finality about such a fate, as grim and final as the degree of kicking and
screaming involved in the attempt to hold on to power. Mubarak and his NDP come
to mind, but look around you, the region and the world, today and across the
length and breadth of human history, are brimful of examples.
As things stand today, it does not look like
the Brotherhood has opted decisively for any one of these two options. Their
instincts, mind-set and political training all seem to push them towards option
one, yet the pull towards option two is no less compelling, made up of their
awareness that they come to power through the agency of a popular revolution,
which they neither instigated nor led, and whose values and aspirations are at
great variance with, and often in diametric opposition to many of the 84 year
old group’s most deeply held notions and beliefs.
How far the spirit of the Egyptian revolution
continues to infuse the nation and its people is not easily apparent. And
certainly, it is tempting to consign it to the dust. Many Western pundits and
media have done so, already; the recently departed but not forgotten erstwhile
ruling military’s bouts of murderous viciousness were invariably carried out
under the false impression that the revolution was over and all that was needed
were mop up operations.
The Brotherhood’s leadership had been operating
under the same misapprehension soon after the overthrow of Mubarak, which
explains their alliance with the military lasting almost up to the eve of
presidential elections, as well as the numerous shocks of discovering that
hundreds of thousands could still be called to the streets in their absence and
in defiance of their various condemnations.
It was this misapprehension also that would
help cost the Brotherhood half their voters in the 3-4 months between the
parliamentary elections and the first round of the presidential elections,
their vote dropping from around 11 million in the first poll, to some 5 million
in the second.
Admittedly, things appear to have changed
dramatically since the presidential elections; Morsi’s accession to
presidential power, and even more significantly, the ignoble, sudden departure
of the Supreme Military Council, in what journalist and analyst Abdallah
El-Sennawy aptly described as “half coup, half accord”, seem to have brought a
decisive end to the tumultuous “transition”, with all its upheavals.
And what with the Brotherhood gradually yet
swiftly consolidating its hold on power, extending its hegemony, very much in
the style of Mubarak’s NDP, over the various organs of the state and beyond
(including a concerted attempt to seize control of the media), feelings of
despondency often bordering on despair are being felt among the ranks of even
some of the most ardent of revolutionary youths.
Yet it is far too early to parrot what has
become a common refrain among much of the Western media: Arab spring turning
into Islamist winter. Indeed, if Newsweek’s regression into infantile
Orientalism, with its ludicrous “Muslim rage” cover is anything to go by, many
of our western colleagues much prefer to see us as the irrational, fanatical
mobs of the recent American embassy frenzy, than as the freedom-loving,
disciplined and heroic revolutionaries of Tahrir. After all, it makes “Western
man” feel all fuzzy inside, as he basks in the wonder that is “Western
Civilization”.
But let the tourism officials worry about “our
image” abroad. What concerns us here is our reality at home.
Whether or not we have seen the last of the
million man marches and ongoing nation-wide uprisings is nearly impossible to
predict. Ultimate “black swans”, such massive upheavals have a “chaotic” logic
of their own; they can neither be made, nor anticipated with any degree of
confidence.
Yet there is little doubt that just below the
surface of Muslim Brotherhood dominated political life the hum of revolutionary
energy continues to resonate across the country. The change in the
authoritarian state structure may have been little more than a change of hats;
yet for millions of Egyptian citizens, the change has been soul-deep.
The values of the revolution live on in the
minds and hearts of hundreds of thousands; not for generations has Egypt seen
such a wide section of the population so politically engaged; and everywhere
across the country Egyptians now see themselves as citizens, no longer
subjects, aware of their grievances as of their rights, willing and able to
organize and to fight for these against the once fearsome ogres of power,
patronage and money.
The upsurge of strikes and diverse forms of
industrial action that have dogged Mohamed Morsi’s presidency from day one is
ample illustration of this, incredible in the breadth of its range and mixture
of grievances, demands, modes of protest and the staggering variety of those taking
part in them – a range so wide, it easily extends from such “classical” blue
collar industrial workers as the textile workers of Mahalla to white collar
teachers and university employees, way across the social spectrum to the
privileged students of the American University in Cairo.
Take also last week’s remarkable graffiti
backlash. The government moves to paint over the revolutionary graffiti of the
main battle grounds of the Egyptian revolution in downtown Cairo. This is done
with almost theatrical swiftness and unusual efficacy and thoroughness –
ostensibly delivering a strong symbolic message: the revolution is over. Two
days later, revolutionary graffiti is back with a vengeance, and a concert is
held in Talaat Harb Square to celebrate the victory. A counter message: the
revolution lives!
If I
were a Muslim Brotherhood leader I would see in this incident a signal no less
ominous than the strike wave, or the almost daily protests before the
presidential palace.
Young people made the Egyptian revolution; I’ve
been privileged to see them in action. They are courageous beyond imagining,
heroic beyond belief, and their love of freedom know no bounds. And not only do
they love freedom, they’ve tasted it, they’ve paid a great price for it, and
they’re not about to see it trampled under military or Muslim Brotherhood
boots.
The Brotherhood’s governmental prospects are
not merely delimited by the continuing revolutionary spirit, however, but also
by their own rather substantial imperfections.
For an octogenarian movement that presumably
has been preparing to take power at the very least for the best part of
Mubarak’s 30-year reign, it’s been astounding to observe the sheer mediocrity
and dearth of imagination and talent of the new leaders of the nation.
It’s pretty pathetic that the first cabinet of
the first elected president after the revolution should be made up of
presumably estimable nonentities, with hardly a single member of the
30-something ministers, including the prime minister, having previously been
known to the public.
Compare Morsi’s cabinet to the post-revolution
cabinet of Essam Sharaf, impotent as it had been, and be amazed at the
contrast, the latter having been top-full of renowned intellectual, scholarly
and public figures, many of whom widely published. In Morsi’s cabinet you’d be
hard pressed to unearth a single coherent public statement, let alone article
or book among the lot.
President Morsi’s first 100-day programme is
remarkable only for its utterly pedestrian nature, as if the Brotherhood
leaders who put it together were randomly picking issues out of a hat. Bringing
an end to traffic congestion within three months is to my mind the starkest
example not only of the sheer randomness of the plan, but of its fictitious
character, as if those who put it together had not the least intention of
fulfilling their promises.
Now, we’re nearly a couple of weeks short of
the first 100 days and traffic is worse than ever. And for the rest: Morsi had
promised to resolve the problems of lack of security, garbage collection, and
shortages of fuel and subsidized bread. The country’s poor quarters continue to
be inundated with garbage, but hey, take a walk through the upper class
district of Zamalek and discover that wading through strewn garbage has become
an Egyptian way of life. And not only has there been no improvement in the
availability of subsidized bread and fuel, but plans to introduce new and
drastic cuts in subsidies loom large on
the horizon.
(Presumably, Morsi’s 100-day programme was put
together by the best minds of the Brotherhood; I urge readers to compare it to
the alternative 100-day plan suggested in Ahram Online by my friend and
colleague, Salma Hussein who, while admittedly extremely talented, had only her
own brain and knowledge to rely on.)
As for
the restoration of security, what we’ve seen hitherto are police raids on
street vendors, which moreover are proving ineffectual, with the vendors
brutally removed, only to return a couple of days later. Add to which the
random appearance of police check points on city roads and highways, which
while of highly dubious efficacy in heightened security tend to exacerbate
another item on the 100-day promise list, notably traffic.
In fact, the fundamental source of the lack of
domestic security lies in an area which the ruling Brotherhood is determinedly
unwilling to recognize, let alone deal with. And this is nothing less than
radically reforming, in the sense of totally overhauling, the domestic security
structure, i.e. the Interior Ministry and its two or three
hundred-thousand-strong police force. Here we have a state body responsible for
countless crimes against the Egyptian people, before, during and since the
revolution. It is an extra-legal force that has killed thousands, humiliated,
tortured and detained hundreds of thousands, all outside the law, and in
flagrant violation of the law.
It is moreover a crooked, half rogue body,
steeped in corruption and overseeing a virtual army of thugs and outlaws, which
we’ve seen deployed for subversion (including instigating and taking part in
mini-pogroms against Copts), murderous attacks on protesters and, why not,
profit. It’s been widely claimed that the wave of ancient Egyptian artifact
robberies that were conducted after the revolution were made by the security
personnel assigned to protect them.
This body has yet to be touched. The military,
with not a whimper of protest from their then Brotherhood allies, had charged
this very body with investigating its own crimes, with the complicity of the
concerned Mubarak formed prosecution bodies. So it was no surprise that, save
for a six-year sentence for a low ranking provincial policeman charged with the
killing of a dozen people, no one has been punished for the televised and video
documented murder of hundreds, maiming and blinding of thousands, let alone for
the previous 30 years of torture and extra-judicial killings.
As in the state-owned media, the Brotherhood’s
policy is to seize control rather than to reform. They’re fine with a lawless
law-enforcement body so long as it is willing to do their bidding; they seem to
even be willing to turn a blind eye both with regards to seeking retribution
for past crimes against their own members, and to whatever present and future
crimes that body, vampire like, deems necessary for its survival.
It is however on the social front that
Brotherhood rule is destined to fall on its face, practically guaranteeing that
their political mastery won’t outlast Morsi’s four-year term. The Egyptian
Revolution was waged under the banner: Bread, Freedom, Social Justice. The
social lies at the heart of the new political energy permeating Egyptian
society since January 2011, almost inseparably tied with the struggle for freedom.
It was
bound to be so, if only as reflection of the fundamental nature of the
oligarchic, crony capitalist regime that held the country in a strangle grip
for decades; a regime where money and political power were so intimately tied,
and in which billionaire capitalist bureaucrats and bureaucrat capitalists, all
happily lay in bed together, saw the nation as their private estate, and
safeguarded their plunder via a highly sophisticated and intricate system of
selective repression, whereby the middle classes were to be intimidated,
bribed, contained and occasionally smacked, while a war of terror was waged,
daily, albeit silently, against the poor and dispossessed, the great majority
of the people.
Pity then that the Brotherhood, brought to
power thanks to that revolution, if not as an expression of its conscious
agency, is for all practical purposes at one with the erstwhile ruling NDP on
economic and social policy. Their leaders, not least the president, spout
neo-liberal dogma with as much ease a Mubarak père, Mubarak fils, and the
defunct regime’s once golden child, a no-neck monster called Ahmed Ezz.
In his last TV interview, the Brotherhood’s
President Morsi, who’s been growing more presidential by the day, came across
as perhaps a kinder Hosni Mubarak, but a Hosni Mubarak nonetheless.
Expressing his sympathy for the plight of the
impoverished majority of his “beloved” flock, Morsi, who often sounds like a
protestant pastor, parroted his predecessor: raising wages in the absence of
real growth means printing money, which means inflation, which in turn means
that wage rises will be eaten away, and growth stifled.
It’s back to “patience” then, the catchphrase
of the Muslim Brotherhood’s economic and social policies since their accession
to power, as it had been of Mubarak and his gang until the very eve of their
removal from power.
It’s is the “wait for growth” argument: we need
to stimulate foreign and domestic investment (basically by keeping you at
starvation wages - ostensibly our “comparative advantage”), and once the
desired high growth rates are achieved (when and how high is never stated), the
magical, mythical, faith-based (since we’ve never really seen it happen)
trickle-down effect will have an effect, and we’ll all be one great happy prosperous
family, under the watchful benevolent eyes of the father of the nation.
The “wait for growth” argument was also
reiterated by the president with respect to the provision of basic services,
including health and education. Unlike Mubarak who would harangue the Egyptian
people for having too many children, Morsi was effusive in his sympathy and
understanding, giving little mini promises of rapid improvement here and there;
yet his most fundamental refrain was: patience, wait for growth.
This argument has been shown for the patent
nonsense it always was, to all who are not firm followers of the IMF religion.
In an economy whose fundamental feature is a massive gap between wealth and
poverty, raising wages, no less than the provision of decent health services
and education to the poor, shifts the distribution of wealth from the
insatiable minority of super rich (what can one family do with 4 or 5 summer
villas, for God’s sake?) to the majority of a population struggling feverishly
to make ends meet, with a great many failing to do even that.
And, in fact, a distributive economic and
social policy is an engine of growth, much more reliable in this regard than
trying to attract foreign investment by the “comparative advantage” of a labour
force hovering just above starvation levels, and having little or no real
access to half-way decent health and education, let alone recreation. (They can
of course take solace in President Morsi’s calming interviews and speeches,
laden with appropriate quotes from the Qur’an and the sayings of the Prophet.)
We might refer here to a very recent report
issued by the UNCTAD, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
which was passed on to me by my friend and colleague, Fouad Mansour, Ahram
Online’s managing editor and a very talented economic journalist in his own
right.
The report, issued on 12 September, is summed
up in a news release as focusing on “the trend towards widening income
inequality that has prevailed within and between most countries since the
1980s.” It goes on to declare its opposition to “the view that growing income
gaps are a necessary byproduct of increased economic efficiency and
globalization. It says instead that greater inequality limits nations’
potentials for growth by reducing demand and investment. “
The report’s summary underlines the following
three findings:
“Austerity did not lead to growth: supportive
government policies are still needed;
“Rising inequality is not inevitable – and
economies will perform better with more even income distribution;
“Reducing inequality through fiscal and incomes
policies is key for growth and development.”
Meanwhile, the Brotherhood’s leadership
continues to hover between attempting to replicate the Mubarak regime, on one
hand, and yielding, as little as possible, to the transformed political
landscape of the country on the other.
However, there is a growing sense that, aware
as they are of the short shelf-life of their rule, they are in a scramble to
grab as much authoritarian powers as they possibly can, in order to perpetuate
their regime, very much in the Mubarak mold.
What we have come to see of the new
Constitution is one indication, the battery of draft laws prepared by the
infamous Interior Ministry, designed basically to criminalize popular protest
and strikes, are another, and so are the on and off violent police clampdowns
on student and worker strike actions and various attacks on freedom of
expression. The attempt to seize control of the state-owned media, and further
of the whole media landscape in the country is yet another ominous indication
of bad intentions.
With only a couple of weeks to go Morsi’s first
100-day promises have proven to be the farce they always were. On social
justice, the Brotherhood have shown themselves no less zealous adherents of the
neo-liberal doctrine than their NDP forebears, and removals of subsidies on
basic goods loom large on the horizon.
Civil liberties is where it all hangs. They’re
the sole guarantee that today’s minority may be tomorrow’s majority, and that
the competition for elected office is played on a relatively even field.
Attack civil liberties and you’ll be booted out
of office, possibly never to return; show them some respect and you may in turn
be shown the door nicely, with the full opportunity to fight another day, and
why not, to change, learn, adapt and even transform yourself.

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